Recommendations and conclusion
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- Recommendations specific to this investigation
- The Government’s response to my recommendations
- Other recommendations
- Conclusion
211. Having found that the manner in which the ex gratia scheme was devised, announced, and operated constituted maladministration causing injustice to Professor Hayward and to those in a position similar to him, I now turn to make recommendations to remedy that injustice.
Recommendations specific to this investigation
First recommendation
212. First, I consider that the MOD should review the operation of the ex gratia scheme .
213. The acknowledged inability of the MOD to provide evidence from their records – without a full review - in relation to indications that the late introduction of the bloodlink criterion may have led to unequal treatment is sufficient in my view to warrant such a review. The need for a thorough review of the scheme is reinforced by the failure to conduct such a review at the time the bloodlink criterion was introduced and also, as no such review had been undertaken, in the light of the later criticisms made of the scheme by the courts and in other places.
Second recommendation
214. Secondly, I consider that the MOD should fully reconsider the position of Professor Hayward and those in a similar position to him .
215. My investigation has shown that it is impossible to determine how many people in a similar position to Professor Hayward in relation to the bloodlink criterion received a payment because their application was determined prior to the introduction of the criterion. The Government accepts that some mistakes did occur. If a thorough review of the scheme confirms that such payments were made prior to (and because of) the late introduction of the bloodlink criterion, I believe that the Government should fully reconsider the effects of that on those whose applications were determined subsequently.
216. What form such reconsideration should take is a matter for the Government. However, I consider that, in undertaking any review, no possible outcome should be ruled out arbitrarily. I would also expect to monitor such a review closely.
Third recommendation
217. My third recommendation is that the MOD should apologise to Professor Hayward and to others in a similar position to him for the distress which the maladministration identified in this report has caused them .
Fourth recommendation
218. Finally, I recommend that the MOD should consider whether they should express that regret tangibly.
The Government’s response to my recommendations
219. I put these recommendations to the Permanent Secretary of the MOD on 18 January 2005. The Permanent Secretary replied on 24 February 2005. I met the Permanent Secretary on 8 May 2005 to discuss the implementation of my recommendations and I received further written representations from him on 22 June 2005, on 23 June 2005 and on 7July 2005.
220. The Government’s response is set out in the annex to this report. As can be seen, the Government has not accepted my recommendations in full but has only agreed to implement my third and fourth recommendations.
221. All of the points made by the Government in the annex are dealt with in the body of this report. It should be evident that I do not accept the MOD’s submissions, although in previous correspondence I have sought (and been provided with) information from the MOD that has contributed to the final version of this report.
222. I am satisfied that my report is clear and comprehensive and that it is not necessary to deal with each part of the Government’s response again here.
Other recommendations
223. In addition to the recommendations specific to this investigation, I wish to bring three more general recommendations to the attention of Parliament. These recommendations have been informed both by this investigation and also by the considerable experience of my Office in dealing with complaints about ex gratia schemes.
224. First, I consider that ex gratia schemes should be devised with due regard to the need to give proper examination to all of the relevant issues before the scheme is announced or otherwise advertised. It is wholly unacceptable for schemes – especially those that are designed to deal with sensitive issues – to be announced, and applications received, before decisions have been taken on key issues such as eligibility. That can only lead to disappointment and distress.
225. Secondly, once advertised and implemented, any changes to eligibility criteria, if such are needed, should be publicised and explained to those potentially affected by the changes. This can prevent individuals feeling that they have been misdirected or otherwise misled.
226. Finally, I wish to emphasise that, where schemes are the subject of large numbers of complaints alleging maladministration or of other criticisms from the courts or in Parliament, I believe that it is good administrative practice to review the relevant scheme. An early recognition that lessons can be learned from complaints and other feedback can prevent systemic failure or a situation in which public resources are expended on remedial action, which would not have been necessary had a thorough review taken place at the appropriate time and had any corrective action been carried out proactively.
Conclusion
227. I have reached my findings in relation to Professor Hayward’s complaint with a degree of regret.
228. The conception of the ex-gratia scheme had much to recommend it and the announcement of 7 November 2000 was widely welcomed. Both Ministers and officials were rightly intent on ensuring that claims were paid as quickly as possible in view of the age of many of the claimants, as was demonstrated by the 14,000 payments made by the WPA in February 2001. Those administering the scheme have paid many more claims than was originally estimated, and continue to meet such claims.
229. In those circumstances, it is a great pity that a comparatively small number of individuals should have been caused such distress as a result of the maladministration of what was, after all, a highly commendable attempt to recognise ‘a debt of honour’. The number of rejected claims from former civilian internees living in this country would appear to be no more than about 300 and those living abroad total approximately 800. Some of those claims may fall to be rejected on grounds other than the bloodlink criterion. That compares with the nearly 24,000 claims that have been paid.
230. However, those for whom this scheme was supposed to offer a tangible expression of ‘a debt of honour’ – owed to them by this country in recognition of the inhuman treatment and suffering they endured in the 1940s at the hands of the Japanese, who considered them to be British - were entitled to expect that the scheme would be devised, announced and administered without maladministration.
231. It is of considerable regret to me that this did not happen. It is also deeply disappointing that the Government has not accepted that it should properly remedy the injustice I have found was caused by maladministration.
