Improving Services / Selected cases / Selected Cases and Summaries of Completed Investigations - April - September 2000

Parliamentary

Access to official information

Health

Parliamentary

Access to official information

Health

Hot topics

Cymraeg

Freedom of Information

Accessibility

Other Ombudsmen and complaint handlers

Feedback

Satisfied with our service?

Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration

Selected Cases and Summaries of Completed Investigations - April to September 2000

Volume 3 - 3rd REPORT - SESSION 2000-2001

Chapter 1

HOME OFFICE

1. Case No. C.429/00

Improper disclosure of information about a member of a prison Board of Visitors

Summary

Mr Bridges complained that information relating to disciplinary proceedings instituted against him by the Home Office, in his capacity as a member of a prison Board of Visitors, had been improperly disclosed to a journalist from The Times newspaper. The Ombudsman found that the journalist had had access to a Home Office submission to the then Minister of State in which criticism of Mr Bridges' behaviour had been reported. The Home Office had subsequently undertaken an internal enquiry into the leak, but had seemingly abandoned that enquiry without reporting to the Minister. The Ombudsman acknowledged that there was a remote possibility that someone other than a member of the Home Office or the Prison Service had been directly responsible for the leak, but considered it more probable that one of the recipients of the submission had either leaked it or passed it to someone else who had leaked it. Whether there had been a direct leak or an unauthorised transmission to another person, the Ombudsman regarded the Home Office as responsible for what had clearly been maladministration leading to an injustice to Mr Bridges. The newspaper article which had resulted from the leak caused Mr Bridges a good deal of distress, anger and embarrassment, prolonged and exacerbated by the Home Office's subsequent failure properly to conclude their enquiry. The Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Home Office agreed in the circumstances to offer Mr Bridges an ex gratia payment of £5,000 in recognition of the distress involved.

Full text

1. In November 1998 Mr Bridges complained to me through his Member of Parliament about what he characterised as unfair, improper, and almost certainly unlawful action by the Home Office in suspending him from the Board of Visitors of HM Prison Bullingdon (the Board), causing that action to be publicised in The Times newspaper, and mounting an enquiry into his conduct as a member of the Board. He alleged that those actions had caused him a great deal of pain, distress and public obloquy, and had affected his earning power adversely and gravely. In January 1999 it was explained to Mr Bridges on my behalf that I was debarred by paragraph 10(1)(c) of Schedule 3 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 from investigating the substance of Mr Bridges' complaint.

2. Subsequently I agreed to investigate the complaint that information relating to proceedings instituted against Mr Bridges by the Minister for Prisons under Rule 92 of the Prison Rules was improperly disclosed to a reporter for The Times, and was used in a report published in The Times on 10 September 1998. I began this investigation in July 1999, having obtained comments from the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Home Office. I have not put into this report every detail investigated by my staff, but I am satisfied that no matter of significance has been overlooked.

Investigation

3. On 10 September 1998 the following article appeared across four columns of the second page of The Times newspaper.

Prisoners' watchdog attacks suspension

A former close colleague of the Home Secretary's wife and his policy adviser is refusing to accept his suspension as a prisoners' watchdog over alleged "rudeness, arrogance and self-deeming superiority".

Brian Bridges, a retired civil servant, has challenged a decision by Lord Williams of Mostyn, the Prisons Minister, to suspend him as a member of the Board of Visitors at Bullingdon prison in Oxfordshire. Mr Bridges, a former Under Secretary at the Health Department, is querying the legal basis for the minister's action. Mr Bridges, 61, said the minister did not seem to know under what power he was suspending him.

A spokesman for the Boards of Visitors said Mr Bridges had been suspended "until further notice". He said an enquiry was being set up to investigate disputes on the board.

Mr Bridges was employed at the Department of Health and Social Services where Alice Perkins, the Home Secretary's wife, Lord Warner, his senior policy advisor, and Mr Straw also worked. In a letter seen by The Times which he sent to Joyce Quin, the former Prisons Minister, in July, he said: "I know Jack and was a close colleague of Alice for many years and to Lord Warner ... I am sure they will give me a chit for honesty and truthfulness."

He was suspended last week after months of criticism and dispute on the board which ended with the acting chairman resigning and other members threatening to leave if Mr Bridges was allowed to stay in post. The former chairman resigned in December 1997 after complaining that Mr Bridges had been "rude and aggressive" to her.

Lord Williams was told that unless action was taken the Board would have so few members that it would be unable to carry out its duties.

Delbert Sandiford, director for Boards of Visitors, wrote to Lord Williams and said the difficulty appeared to lie with Mr Bridges' conduct. "Comments made by board members about Mr Bridges refer to his arrogance, rudeness, self-deemed superiority."

Mr Bridges denied he had been rude, arrogant or aggressive: "I always try to express my views courteously."

4. On the day the article appeared Mr Bridges wrote to the Minister of State at the Home Office (the Minister), complaining that the article in The Times quoted from a confidential letter that Mr Bridges had sent to the then [July 1998] Minister for Prisons. He asked for an explanation of how The Times had obtained a copy of that letter, which had not been copied to anybody else by him.

5. Also on 10 September the director for Boards of Visitors (the Director) wrote to the Minister saying that the article in The Times quoted accurately from a submission that he had made to the Minister on 17 August inviting him to suspend Mr Bridges' membership of the Board. The Director said that he had copied that submission to 11 other persons within the Home Office and the Prison Service, and that he did not believe that any of those recipients would have copied the document to Mr Bridges. The copy recipients were:

The Home Secretary,

The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office,

The Home Office's Permanent Under Secretary of State,

The Director General of the Prison Service,

The Home Office Director of Operations (South),

The Prison Service Director of Regimes,

The Prison Service Central Area Manager,

The Home Office Communications Director,

The Prison Service Press Officer,

The Home Secretary's special adviser (policy),

The Deputy Director for Boards of Visitors.

(On 15 July the Director had sent to an almost identical list of copy recipients a copy of Mr Bridges' letter to the then Minister for Prisons, as an annex to a submission to that Minister. That earlier submission had been attached as an annex to the submission of 17 August.)

6. On 14 September, in a further submission to the Minister, the Director said that the journalist who had written the article had been asked how he came by the information about Mr Bridges but had declined to say; it was very unlikely that they would be able to establish how the information had come into the journalist's possession. On 17 September the Director and the Director of Regimes met the Minister. It was agreed that the Director would ask the Home Office's Departmental Security Unit to conduct a leak enquiry. That day the Director wrote to the Departmental Security Unit attaching copies of the Times article and his submission of 17 August. He said that there appeared to have been a breach of security which had resulted in a leak to The Times. He asked the Departmental Security Unit to undertake an enquiry and prepare a report for the Minister.

7. Also on 17 September the Minister replied to Mr Bridges. He said that the journalist who had written the article had been asked to reveal the source of his information, but had declined to do so. The Minister said that he had asked for enquiries to be made to trace the source of the leak. He regretted the fact that what should have been regarded as a private matter had been exposed to the media.

8. On 21 September the Departmental Security Unit noted that preliminary enquiries should be arranged, starting with interviews with the Director and Press Officers, followed by a questionnaire. On 22 September a Departmental Security Unit security inspector interviewed the Director. According to the inspector's note of the interview, the Director explained that he had made his submission of 17 August to invite the Minister to suspend Mr Bridges from the Board because of the effect that Mr Bridges' behaviour was having on other members. The submission had not been given a protective marking. On 18 August Mr Bridges had telephoned the Director and asked what was going on. On 10 September the article had appeared in The Times giving details, word for word in places, of his submission. The Director had no idea how The Times had gained knowledge of, or a copy of, the submission. He had not discussed it with anyone other than those in his office. He still had his copy on file in his office. Upon publication of the article he had immediately telephoned The Times; but they had refused to divulge their source.

9. Also on 21 September the inspector contacted the Prison Service Press Office, who told him that the Press Officer to whom the Director's submission had been copied had since left the organisation. They recalled that he had received his copy of the submission, which had then been circulated in the Press Office as a matter of routine and placed on file, where it remained. They had no idea how it had been leaked to The Times.

10. On 25 September Mr Bridges wrote to the Minister. Among other points about his suspension from the Board, he asked how the Minister intended to address the consequences for Mr Bridges of the article in The Times. He commented that the malice of the article, in particular the reference to "rudeness, arrogance and self-deeming superiority", could not be ignored. That was deliberately engineered nastiness intended to cause personal hurt to a private citizen doing unpaid voluntary work. It was an inescapable conclusion that the material used by The Times could have come only from the Minister, the Home Office, or a member of the Board.

11. On 6 October the inspector wrote to each of the recipients of the Director's submission of 17 August, asking them to complete a questionnaire. (The questionnaire is reproduced in an annex to this report.) With the exception of the Home Secretary, each of the recipients completed and returned the questionnaire. On 23 October the inspector produced a summary of the replies. He commented that any of Mr Bridges' supporters in his dispute with the Board who had received a copy or had knowledge of the submission of 17 August might have had reason to pass on information to Mr Bridges or to The Times. Unfortunately, the document had not been given a protective marking. All the respondents to the questionnaire had denied knowledge of how the information had been leaked and who had been responsible. Only a few others could have had access to the document. The general feeling was that no damage had been caused to the Prison Service as a result of the article. In the circumstances a successful conclusion to the enquiry was most unlikely, and there appeared to be little point in further investigation.

12. On 5 November the Departmental Security Unit noted that in his reply to the questionnaire the Prison Service Central Area Manager had said that, in the absence of any protective marking on the document, he had sent a copy marked "Restricted-Management" to the Governor of HM Prison Bullingdon; a questionnaire should therefore be sent to the Governor. On 12 November the Governor completed the questionnaire, indicating that he had not leaked the document or shown or copied it to anyone: his personal secretary had filed it; and the only other person who had had access to it had been the Deputy Governor. He added that much of what had been reported in The Times had been common knowledge among Board members, himself, and colleagues.

13. On 26 November the Departmental Security Unit prepared for the Minister a draft report of their investigation. They said that they had found nothing in any of the completed questionnaires to suggest where blame for the leak might lie. The submission of 17 August had been shown to very few people and had not appeared to arouse any great interest or excitement. Even though it had not been given a protective marking, all the recipients appeared to have treated it sensitively and had taken appropriate care in looking after it. There were varying views as to why the information had been leaked, but none of those contained anything substantial. All the recipients had been of the opinion that the leak had not damaged the Prison Service. Under the heading "Conclusions", the Departmental Security Unit said that if Mr Bridges had any supporters who had received a copy or had knowledge of the submission then perhaps they had had reason to pass on the information to him or to The Times. It was clear from Mr Bridges' telephone call of 18 August to the Director that, at the very least, Mr Bridges had been told something about the document. They had been informed that the Home Secretary was a friend of Mr Bridges; although no response had been received from the Home Secretary's office they thought that nothing enlightening would have come from such a reply. The Home Secretary's special adviser, also identified as a friend of Mr Bridges, had denied any knowledge of how the leak had been effected. Denial was a common response in all the replies. However, another common response was that no harm had been caused to the Prison Service by the article. Although it seemed most likely that the source of the leak lay with one of the copy recipients, denial was easy and a successful conclusion to the enquiry was unlikely. Given that the document had described Mr Bridges' behaviour and the effect it was having upon other members of the Board, and that it had in effect been an invitation to suspend Mr Bridges from the Board, the absence of a protective marking was surprising, but probably a simple oversight. Although such a marking was no guarantee that information would not be leaked, it might have prevented it in the present case. The Departmental Security Unit therefore recommended that any documents that discussed a person's conduct should include a suitable caveat.

14. On 30 November the Departmental Security Unit noted that the report was rather inconclusive; there were some aspects that could be pursued, namely the handling of the document by the offices of the Home Secretary and his special adviser; whether there had been any further dissemination of the document at HM Prison Bullingdon; and the handling of Mr Bridges' letter to the former Minister for Prisons. That was how matters stood when the Member referred Mr Bridges' complaint to me.

15. On 12 January 1999 my staff asked the Prison Service about the progress of the Departmental Security Unit's investigation. On 26 January the Deputy Director replied that the Departmental Security Unit hoped to conclude their enquiries within the next week or so; the results would be reported to the Minister in due course. On 26 April the Departmental Security Unit told my staff that they had recently concluded their enquiries and their report would be ready within the next two weeks. On 1 June I put a statement of Mr Bridges' complaint to the Home Office's Permanent Under Secretary of State.

16. On 27 July the Departmental Security Unit sent a report to the Minister. In a covering submission, they said that they had conducted a preliminary enquiry, and in November had reached the provisional conclusion that the source of the leak was unlikely to be found. The file had been left open should any further line of enquiry emerge. On further review, it had been decided not to pursue other possible lines of enquiry as the chances of ascertaining responsibility for the leak were felt to be limited. The Departmental Security Unit regretted that a report had not been sent to the Minister at that time; they had not fully appreciated that the Minister was due to write to Mr Bridges about the outcome.

17. The Departmental Security Unit's report to the Minister was based on the same factual material as their draft report of 26 November 1998 (paragraph 4.13), and made the same findings, adding that opportunistic access to the submission of 17 August could not be ruled out entirely but seemed remote. Under the heading "Conclusion", they said that there seemed to have been two possibilities. First, Mr Bridges was said to be acquainted with the Home Secretary's wife and his special adviser. Both the Home Secretary and the special adviser had received a copy of the submission of 17 August. Either had been in a position to tip off Mr Bridges about his suspension from the Board if so inclined, but were unlikely to have wanted to leak information on the subject to the journalist. A more possible scenario was that the leak had emanated from HM Prison Bullingdon, and particularly from a member of the Board. Mr Bridges had been unpopular on the Board. It might not be unconnected that a copy of the submission had been sent to the Governor, albeit under a protective marking. Dissemination there was said to have been limited to the Governor's secretary and the Deputy Governor. Nevertheless, the Governor had said that much of what had been reported to The Times had been common knowledge among Board members, himself and colleagues. The Departmental Security Unit went on to say that those conclusions were clouded by the fact that the journalist had also had access to, or been made aware of, Mr Bridges' letter of July 1998 to the former Minister for Prisons. They could only speculate that that letter had either been leaked by Mr Bridges himself or by one of his alleged supporters to present a balanced view of Mr Bridges in the light of the submission. The leaking of the letter could have been in response to an approach from the journalist who made clear his knowledge of the submission. The Departmental Security Unit concluded that no specific damage appeared to have been done. Further investigation could have been made; but the preliminary view had been that a successful conclusion was unlikely. They recommended that no further action be taken on the enquiry. Regarding the absence of a protective marking for the submission of 17 August, the Departmental Security Unit reached the same conclusion and made the same recommendation as in their draft report of 26 November 1998.

The Home Office's reply to the complaint

18. In his comments to me the Permanent Under Secretary of State said that he accepted that there had been a delay in the conduct of the investigation to establish how information about Mr Bridges' suspension from the Board had come into the possession of The Times. He apologised for that delay. However, the investigation had not been able to establish how the information had reached the newspaper and Mr Bridges had not indicated how the information had caused him financial loss. In those circumstances, the Home Office did not propose to pay compensation to Mr Bridges.

Further enquiries

19. My staff interviewed Mr Bridges. Mr Bridges said that he had not sent a copy of his letter of July 1998 to the then Minister for Prisons to anyone other than the Director (to whom he had faxed it on 10 July 1998), and no one else could have seen the letter because he had typed it at home. He had never seen or received a copy of the Director's submission of 17 August 1998 to the Minister. He recalled that he had telephoned the Director shortly before receiving notification of his suspension to ask him what was going on, but did not recall anything significant about the content of that call. He had not made a note of the call, although he did remember that the Director had told him that he would soon receive a letter. Mr Bridges subsequently emphasised also that he did not want to be even remotely associated with any suggestion that the Home Secretary, the Home Secretary's wife, or the Home Secretary's special adviser had played a part in the leak.

20. When asked about his contact with The Times, Mr Bridges said that his only contact had been on 9 September 1998. He had been out; and on his return his wife had told him that a journalist from The Times had telephoned. He had checked the journalist's credentials and called him back. The journalist had asked him what he had to say about criticisms made of him by members of the Board. The journalist had used the term "self-deeming arrogance", a turn of phrase which Mr Bridges remembered having been used for the first time by a colleague at a Board meeting on 6 August 1998 which had been attended by the Deputy Director. Without making any reference to his correspondence with the Minister, Mr Bridges had told the journalist that he believed he had expressed his views courteously. The journalist had not implied reference to Ministerial correspondence, but had assured him that the information had not come from his opponents on the Board. Mr Bridges went on to say that on the day of the article's publication he had received a number of calls from friends commiserating with him and wanting to help. He believed that being publicly described in the article as having an attitude problem had not been a good advertisement for his work as a public affairs consultant, and had lost him work. The Times was still the newspaper of the establishment and was read by people to whom he might apply for jobs.

21. Mr Bridges provided my staff with a note of his conversation with the journalist on 9 September 1998, which he said he had written on the day of the call. According to that note, the journalist "explained that he had heard I had been rude, domineering etc. etc. - the words taken from one or another bit of correspondence on the topic". The note records that Mr Bridges explained his point of view but refused to discuss his correspondence with the Minister, except to make clear that he did not think that he was in fact suspended, due to the Minister's erroneous quoting of the power of suspension. The note contains the following paragraph:

"I asked [the journalist] where he had obtained his information. He refused to say save that he gave me a "categorical assurance" that it was not from "my opponents on the Board". I said that left either general gossip (I meant, though I did not say so, at the recent BOV [Boards of Visitors] Conference) or Ministers. [The journalist] refused to answer, saying airily that his information could have come from almost anywhere."

22. Among the Home Office's papers is a "press file note" dated 9 September 1998 in which the Press and Publicity Officer for the Boards of Visitors Secretariat recorded having received a telephone call from the journalist requesting information about the Bullingdon Board. The note records that the line to be taken was that on 21 August Mr Bridges had been suspended by the Minister further to an enquiry into his behaviour as a member of the Board. All enquiries should be routed in the first instance to the Press and Publicity Officer.

23. My staff interviewed the Press and Publicity Officer who had made that note. He recalled that the journalist had said that he had heard that a member of the Board had been suspended and had asked him whether he knew anything about it. He had replied with the "line to take" as compiled from information supplied by officials and recorded in the note. He had not said anything else and had heard nothing more before the appearance of the article. As far as he knew nobody else had received any press enquiries on the subject. He had not seen any of the correspondence referred to in the article.

24. My staff asked the journalist if he could say who had supplied the information on which he had based his article of 10 September 1998, and whether he could confirm the accuracy of Mr Bridges' note of their conversation of 9 September 1998 (paragraph 4.21), in particular the paragraph about the journalist's source. The journalist replied that under his professional obligation he could not disclose the identity of the source or sources of his report. Having written many stories since September 1998, he could not recall his conversation with Mr Bridges, but had no reason to contradict what Mr Bridges said.

Findings

25. It is clear that the journalist who wrote The Times article of 10 September 1998 had access to two documents, Mr Bridges' letter of July 1998 to the then Minister for Prisons, and the Director's submission of 17 August 1998 to the Minister of State. It is conceivable that the journalist obtained those documents from different sources; but the fact that all, or almost all, of the recipients of the submission within the Home Office had also received the letter suggests that they were disclosed from the same source. In any event, the quotation in the article about Mr Bridges' alleged "arrogance, rudeness, self-deemed superiority" came directly from the submission. I consider therefore that the Home Office were correct to focus their enquiries upon the submission.

26. On 17 September 1998 the Director asked the Departmental Security Unit to undertake an enquiry and prepare a report for the Minister. I find no fault with the steps taken by the Departmental Security Unit up to the end of November 1998. At that point, the gist of the Departmental Security Unit's conclusions was that the most likely source of the leak was one of the copy recipients of the submission; that they were unlikely to discover which one; that the leak had done no harm to the Prison Service; and that in view of its content the submission should have been given a protective marking. They recognised the possibility of making further enquiries. I consider that the correct action on the basis of those conclusions would have been either to report them to the Minister as they stood, pointing out that further enquiries could be made, or to institute further enquiries forthwith. Instead, as far as can be ascertained from the Home Office's papers, the Departmental Security Unit did nothing further, other than review the file, until July 1999. That inaction appears to have persisted despite enquiries by my staff, to whom the Prison Service gave assurances which were not fulfilled. It appears that had it not been for Mr Bridges' complaint to me the matter would simply have been left indefinitely as it was at the end of November 1998. I strongly criticise the Departmental Security Unit for seemingly abandoning their enquiry without reporting to the Minister. (I am aware that it is Mr Bridges' view that the Departmental Security Unit knew or supposed that abandoning their enquiry was what the Minister wanted. I report that view while stressing that I have found no evidence to support it.)

27. Furthermore, I note that the Departmental Security Unit referred repeatedly to their view that the leak had done no harm to the Prison Service. Whether that was true or not, the fact that the information in question concerned Mr Bridges meant that the possibility of harm to him should also have been considered. I find it deplorable that an unwarranted disclosure of criticism of the behaviour of an individual was subsequently discussed internally by the Department in terms which implied that they had less reason to pursue the matter than they would have done had the material disclosed attracted criticism of the Department. In the circumstances, the Permanent Under Secretary's apology for delay in the conduct of the investigation (paragraph 4.18) falls significantly short of an adequate recognition of the Department's fault. (I note also that at no time have the Department written to Mr Bridges to apologise.)

28. Having said that, I consider that the Departmental Security Unit would have been entitled to recommend that no further investigation be made purely on the grounds that the prospects of a successful outcome appeared slim - a view from which I see no reason to dissent. The question remaining, therefore, is whether there was maladministration by the Home Office which led to injustice to Mr Bridges.

29. The absence of a protective marking on the submission of 17 August 1998 was, as the Departmental Security Unit have already pointed out, a surprising omission which made it less likely that the document would be handled with the sensitivity its content demanded. Such a marking would presumably not greatly deter anyone who was so inclined from deliberately leaking the document to the press. Whether anyone in the Home Office did that has not been established. The Departmental Security Unit initially concluded (paragraph 4.13) that the most likely source of the journalist's information was the copy recipients of the submission, all of whom were Ministers or officials in the Home Office or members of the Prison Service. The Departmental Security Unit later concluded (paragraph 4.17) that it was possible that the source was a member of the HM Prison Bullingdon Board of Visitors. However, by Mr Bridges' account (paragraph 4.21) the journalist assured him that the information had not come from Mr Bridges' opponents on the Board. I acknowledge that there is a remote possibility that someone other than a member of the Home Office or the Prison Service was directly responsible for the leak. More probable is that one of the recipients of the submission either leaked it or passed it to someone else who leaked it. At the very least, as the originators of the submission, the Home Office were responsible for its safekeeping, and should have made sure that it remained under their direct control at all times and that its content was not disclosed inappropriately. Whether there was a direct leak or an unauthorised transmission to another person, I regard the Home Office as responsible for what was clearly maladministration leading to an injustice to Mr Bridges.

30. It seemed to me that, whatever the concerns about the unresolved question of individual responsibility for the leak of information about Mr Bridges from a sensitive internal Home Office document, it was clear that no blame for the leak attached to Mr Bridges and, although the Home Office had speculated that a third party might be to blame, they had chosen not to pursue further enquiries which might have clarified that possibility. In the circumstances it seemed to me that responsibility for remedying any injustice caused to Mr Bridges by the leak fell squarely on the Home Office. As to the nature of that injustice, it is not within my gift to determine such factors as alleged damage to reputation and consequent potential loss of earnings; those are matters for the courts (or for arbitration, if Mr Bridges and the Home Office were to accept that as appropriate). Nevertheless, I do not doubt that many of Mr Bridges' former, present, and potential future colleagues and acquaintances read The Times or have been made aware of its content; the article of 10 September 1998 must have caused him a good deal of distress, anger and embarrassment. That can only have been prolonged and exacerbated by the Home Office's subsequent failure properly to conclude the enquiries that the Minister had assured him on 17 September 1998 were in hand (paragraph 4.7), and to address his grievance as he had put it to them in his letter of 25 September 1998 (paragraph 4.10). I therefore recommended to the Permanent Under Secretary that the Home Office should offer Mr Bridges an ex gratia payment sufficient to recognise the substantial distress caused to him by their mishandling of the submission of 17 August 1998 and of their subsequent enquiries.

31. The Permanent Under Secretary replied that he accepted that there had been delays in the Departmental Security Unit's investigation and in reporting back on that. He also accepted that the investigation should not have suggested that concern in such cases was only with the possibility of harm to the Department. However, given the inconclusive nature of the enquiries, he did not accept that the Department had necessarily been responsible for any unauthorised disclosure of information, or bore responsibility for the article that had appeared in The Times. Nevertheless, in the particular circumstances of the case, and in view of the fact that I had recommended that an ex gratia payment should be made, the Permanent Under Secretary had decided to offer Mr Bridges such a payment to seek to draw a line under the affair. He did not intend that his offer should set a precedent for paying compensation in other cases where material about individuals that had appeared in confidential official advice might have been published in the media; all such cases depended on their own facts. The Permanent Under Secretary proposed to offer Mr Bridges the sum of £5,000 as an appropriate overall payment for the distress involved.

Conclusion

32. Mr Bridges' complaint was fully justified. The leak of confidential material of a kind highly embarrassing to him from a sensitive internal Home Office document was clearly maladministrative; and the Home Office made matters worse by shortcomings in their investigation and their initial response to Mr Bridges' complaint to them about it. I regard the Permanent Under Secretary's offer to Mr Bridges of an ex gratia payment of £5,000 in recognition of the distress he suffered as a suitable response to my findings.

Annex – The Departmental Security Unit's Questionnaire

Previous < Contents > Next

Last updated: 4 April 2005